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Probably no other questions within t e last three decades

have involved the 5.)pretneCort of the United States in more
ierplexinr disciussions
of various clauses in

than those req:iring the construction
the Federal aonstitution,

as applied

to the laws rroverninf. corporations.
A constantly increasing

tendency toward centralization

and consolidation has made the old methods of doing b';siness
on a larre scale expensive and impracticable,
same time,

it

has become apparent

while,

at the

that under corporate

form,

enormous industrial interests can be controlled and managed
with wonderful facility.

As a natural result,

the number of

corporations has increased at an almost incredible rate and to

suCh an extent that now, they control -the bulk of the business
of this country.

This change in

our industrial methods has

necessitated a great deal of legislation,

and we find the

state law-making bodies constantly engaged in revising, repealing and enacting laws for the government of corporations.
It is a well-known fact that legislation makes litigation,
and this fact has never been be4tter exemplified than in the
instance we are fow considering.

While our legislatures have

been continually przzled and harassed in

the attempt

to make

perfect laws to regulate these enterprising legfal entities,
our courts have been no less perplexed and bewildered in their

C)

effort to apply old rules and principles to entirely new
situations and circumstances.
S

Qrns

The Pederal Slipreme Court

to be tle goal for which this class
The magnitude of the

striving;

f litipants are ever

interests concerned impells

the interested parties to continie their legal strife until
the decision of that last tribunal has been obtained,

and the

volumes of the United States reports show a constantly increasing number of cases brought~by laws applicable to corl.orations.
In many of the questions thus presented for discussion,
the constitutionality of some state statute has been the primal
consideration,

and this has necessitated a cf;nstructi..n of

some clase of the 'ederal

constitution in almost every in-

The case of Maine vs. The Crand Trunk Railway is of

stance.

this kind, its decision resting fundamentally on the construLction placed upon the third clause of 2ection F, Article
III of the

Federal Constitution,

which provides that:---

"Congress shall have power to reFulhte commerce with foreign
nations,

and among the several states,

and with the Indian

tribes."
The case arose under a laine statute providing that every
corporation, person or association, operating a railroad in
the state s'ovld pay to he state treas~'rer for the use of the
state, an annual excise tax for the privilege of exercising
its franchise in

the state,

to be determined by the amnount of

its gross transportation receipts;
road lying partly

and in

the case of

within and partly without the state,

a
by the

same proportion of the gross receipts as the mileage of the
road in the state bears to its gross mileage.

The Grand Trunk

Railwa-, Company refused to pay this tax, claiming that it was
a violation of the provision of the Federal Constitution cited
above, and the

state of Maine bro~ight snit to enforce its

collection.
IMAr.

Justice Field, who wrote the opinion of !.he prevailing

side of the court, maintained that the tax was not an infringe,,lent upon the clawIse of the constitution above referred

to,

since it was not a tax upon commerce bizt an excise tax, specifically stated to be -nch in the statute, cand imposed ipon the
1rivileve of exercising the franchise of the company in the
state of Malne.

Te said further:--

"The privilege of exercising the franchises of a cor-

poration within a state is generally one of value, and often
of graat value, r:nd the subject of earnest contention.
natural, therefore,

It is

that the corporation should be made to

bear -ome proportion of the burdens of poverwnent.

As the

granting of the privilege rests entirely in the discretion of
the sitate, whether the corpora..ion be of foreign or domestic
origin, it may be conferr'ed upon stuch conditions, pecuniary
or otherwise, as the state in its judgment may deem most conducive to its interests or policy.

It may require

the payment

into its treasury, each year, of a specific sum, or may

appor-

tion the amount exacted according to the value of the business
permitted, as disclosed by its gains or receipts of the present
or past years.
is

The character of the tax, or its

validity,

not determined by the mode adopted in fixing its amount for

any specific period or the times of its

payment.

The whole

4

field of inquiry into the extant of revenue from sources at the
command of the corporation is open to the consideration of the

State in determining what may be Justly exacted for the privilege.

The rule of apportioning the charge to the receipts

of the business would seem to be eminently reasonable, and likely to produce the most satisfactory results, both to the State
and the corporation taxed."
Probably no decision of the Federal Supreme Court has been
more vigorously attacked than the one, a portion of which we
have Just cited.

We have seen many expressions of opinion in

rerard to it, and they are nearly unanimouas in their disappro-p
bation of the ideas advanced.

A number of other cases have

divided the Supreme Court five to four as did this case, but
in other instances, the prevailing opinion has been generally
approved, while in

Maine vs. Grand Trunk Railway, the argu-

ments used in the dissenting opinion seem to have succeeded in
raining more adherents from the community at large.
Before considering the able dirtsentinp opinion of Mr.
Justice Bradley, with whom concurred Justices Harlan, Lamar and
Brown, let

I

examine a little more carefully into the ease

before us and consider first the attitude of the legislature
toward railroad corporations in Foneral, with., a view to aacertaining the reasons existing for the azssement of the tax
in question.
As is so well stated by Mr.J :stice Field, in the language
already quoted, the privilege of exercising the franchises of a
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corporation is generally one of -reat value.

This is partic-

ularly true of a corporation, q7iasi-public in its nature, like
a rZ ilroad, possessing many valu0able attributes which are not
The right given

conferred-pon private corpofate bodies.

to a body of individuals to control and operate for f-ain a
fhe
f-neral highway system of the state, and to ex-

portion of

erci:e in s,ch operation the sovereign pow-)er of eminent domain,
is a privilege which cert&inly merits ,-ome return from the

recipients.
The only way in which the state can receive compensation
for the great benefits
taxation.

thus conferred is

through the medium of

And here arises a most serious problem.

What

method of taxation will at the sait time secure +he beat retv.rns to th. state and prove most equable to the corporation

There are four principal methods in vogue for the taxation
of corporation, which are us follows:--e
First:--

Upon the corporate franchise.

Second:-

Upon the corporate property.

Third:--

Upon the capital stock.

Four ,,h:-- Upon the business (one or profits accruing.

The riethod which first prevailed in the United States was
the taxation or corporations ulpon L}eir re~al and personal property, and this method is still adheri;d to by many of them.

But

this system of taxation h~s never attained the success expected
for several reasons.

The expense attached to the assessment

6

and collection of such a tax makes its returns comparattvel
small, zLfnd in proportion is

the net returns to

.- the state

over the cost of the levy are treater or smaller, so the burden
The state ex-

upon the corporation becomes less or Freater.

pects a certain proportionate amount of revenue from the taxation of coroporations.

If

this amo-nt falls short, the rate

of taxation upon the corporations must be correspondingly increased.
The difficulty of accurately appraising the right of way
and rolling stock of a railroad is another strong
this manner of taxation.

objection to

The brildings, fixtures and real

vroperty are easily accessible, have a definite situs, and can
be rc adily appraised*

Elt there is a lare amount of railroad

property, mdvable in its nature, which it
locate in any one place,

is extremely hard to

and mlch of this escapes taxation.

The taxation of capital stock, on the other hand, meets
with much complaint of injlistice to holders.
if

Capital stock

taken as a basis for the taxation of a corpcration is first

t-xed as a whole and as The property of the colpporation.
the shares,

But

being private personal prop'erty in the hands of in-

dividmttls, ace also subject to assessment as such private property,

and this

brings about a system of double taxat'ion that

entails an ac'ual hardship upon the stockholders.

In some

siates shares of stock are exempt by statute when the corporation itself is

taxed upon the capital stock.

But the state,

havinr Jurisdiction of the person) may t x a shareholder upon
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shares held by him in a foreign corporation whose property is
beyond its J1,risdiction, the residence of the owner being considered the situs of the stock.

It will th s be seen

that

it is ro 4imple matter to frame a statute which answers all the
manifold requirements above indicated.
Now the Maine statute under consideration proposes a different method.

iet -s examine it more fully in the light of

these diffioulties surrom ding any proposed pln of taxation.
Section I provides:--

"The buildings of every railroad corpor-

ation or association, whether within or without the located

right of way, and its lands and fixtures outside of its loeated
riFht of way, shall be subject to taxation by the several
cities and towns in which such buildings, land and fixtures
may be situated, as other property is taxed therein."
This is a perfectly simple and Justifiable assessment upon
the real and personal property of the corporation which has an
actual location and can be easily and specdily ascertained and
collected by each municipality.
8ection I1 provides:-- "Every corporation, person or associati n, operating any railroad in this state, shall pay to the
state treasuorer for the use of the state, an annual excise
tax, for the privilege of exercising its franchises in this
stats, which with the tax provided for in section one (supra)
shall be in lieu of all taxes upon such railroad, its property
nd stock.

There shall be apportioned and paid by the state

from the taxes received under the pr4visions of this act, to the
several cities and towns in which,

on the first day of April in

each year, is held

railrold stock here

taxation, an amount equal to one per

exempted fromother

centum of the val Xc of

such stock on that day, as delermined by the governor and the
council;

provided, however, that the total amount thus appor-

tioned on account of any railroad shall not exceed the sum received by the state as tax on account of such railroad."
These two sections comprise the whole theory of the stat.

..
he remainder of the statute merely contains the pro-

visions for the manner in which the tax shall be assessed,
which is, as we have stated, by a reference

.to the gross trans-

portation receipts, that are to be divided by the number of mile,
of railroad operated to asoertain the averare gross receipts
per mile, and then the tax is assessed upon the gross transportation receipts in an increasing ratio as the average gross
receipts per mile increase.

When a road lies partly within

and partly without the state, the tax shall be equal to the
same proportion of the gross receipts in this state, to be
ascertained by dividing the

total gross receipts by the whole

number of miles operated and multiplying by the number of miles
;ithin the state.
We are led to consider this scheme most just and equitable
to all conc mred.

The road is relieved of all taxation save

that provided for in the sections above cited, and that can be
easily and accurately assessed ano collected.

There is a

pecial exemption of the stock from taxation, so that the op-
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pressive double taxation feut'ire is dore away with.
While it
boin

is

true

that

the gross emaoiint of business which is

transacted by a corporation is not always an accurate

incication of the v-jve of

Its property and franchises,

cun think of no other manner of estimating its
lik}ely to be more r~liable.

worth %%ihich is

Certainly the capital stock, with

its constant fluct:ation iinder The hands of
tors is not;

we

al

3tr-et . opera-

nor could the net receipts be safely taken as a

basis for taxation, since cross mismanagement and fraudulent
Giversion of profits into ostensible betterments and improvements, mif-ht easily leave the corporation with no net receipts
whatever.
We have been led to consider the apparent fairness of this
scheme of taxation at some length,

rom

,he fact that in all

comments on this case which have come to our notice,

the statute

itself, ar; a whole, has received little
ov no attention,
having been apparently assumed on all sides th; t i tsole
was extortion and oppression.

it
purpose

Even the learned justice whQ

wrote the di isenting opinion strongly implies this idea.
has possibly,

t

escaped the notice or some of the able commenta-

tors upon this decision that this statute was not framed with
the solo purpose of' collecting a smnall tax from the Gr .nd Trunk
Rhilway Company, bt to relate
the whole policy of the state
of

aine in its tax dealings

ders,

itth

te

arot

and a decision declar-ing this statute

whin its borto be unconstitu-

10
tional would be of v'tal consequence to '.he state.
ip

We have puro3(.ly avoided
arguments so ably s.ef

roas)onzbleness

Ir.

the dissontinCg opinion of

forth in

wishing to well eslablish first

Dridley,

,TStice

to this time the opposing

rid equity of the statute in

the foneral
Even

question.

our opponents must admit that as applied to railroads wholly
within the state,
when it

is

no 'possible objection c-n be made to it.

But

sought to apply this system of taxation to a road

lying partly within and partly without the boudnries of
the state,

the attorreys

r, nd Trunk Railway,

for the

raise

their voices in an outbreak of patriotic enthusiasm and declare
that we are endangering the commerce of the country and overUnited Sl,ates.

turning the constitution of the
This

n

ntion while apparently upheld by the weight of

athority, is, nevertheless

"&

believe, unsound.

It was

manifestly not the purpose of the legislature of Maine to lay afLj
restriction upon inter-state commerce or to in any way endeavor
to control or regulate it.
considerable business in
and

rivilees.

Vere was a rLtllroad transacting

their state and recciving many benefits
not pay its share of the bur-

T.y.-should it

To allow it to co entirely free from taxdons of the state?
ation would be to to discriminate against the road wholly within

its bounda.ries in favor of a foreign corporation.

The state

did not attempt to tax the business of this railroad, but simply
to require some ret~rM for the privileg~e of exercising its corporate franchise within its borders.
at the vlue

of that frnclise

it

And in order to arrive

proposed the sc,,ome above

set
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forth;-

that of

sing the gross reccipts

.s an indication of

the probable value of the entire fr nchise

and a' proportion

,

t ,er of equivalaRt to the proportionate Maine mileage of the
ro:d as a fair basis for estimating; the value of the franchise
in that state.

v'e fail to see that the operation of this stat-

ute could interfere with inter-state cominerce in the slightest
degree.
The fundamental question at the bottom of this whole inter-

state connerce discussion is really as to what constitutes a
",re ulation" of commerce between the states within the meaning
Jf the constitution.

And it is right hero,

in our opinion, t ay

the Courts have b:on led astray in their zeal to carry out the
intention of the framers of that instriment.

Although the

decisions of the Supreme Court in the large number of cases on
this subject which have come before it, have been based on widely varied reasons, yet the

ttimate design in each instance has

been to adhere as strictly as possible to the ideas which were
preseint in the minds of the men who placed this much-discussed
clause in the constitution.
It is somewhat singular that in all the exhaustive and profound arguments which have been advanced on both sides of this
controversy, little or no reference has been made to the peculiar condition of affairs existing In

the Colonies at the

time of the adoption of the constitution.

The thirteen origi-

nal colonies were practically independent political
owing an allegiance to Great Britain;

but

communitie#

w:ith respect to
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internal matters amonp themselves,
and independent.

This was particularly true as to commerce

both foreign and domestic,
which regulated

each colony was sovereign

s there was no peneral authority

their intercourse with each other.

As a con-w

sequence those colonies situated tore favorably from a geographical standpoint,

embraced the opportunity to impose taxes upon

the commerce of the other colonies which had to pass through
their ports.

This was puromptly resented, and retaliatory

measures were adopted by the colonies thus taxed,

and a general

feeling of irritation and unjust discrimination grew up, until
"New Jersey, placed between Philadel-

as was said at the time,-

phia and New York was likened to a cask tapped at both ends;
and North Carolina between Virginia and South Carolina, to a
patient bleeding at both arms."
The attempt to correct this evil state of affairs made by
tVe confereration was entirely

/As

Ocessful owing to the want of

power of that body to enforce its authority,

and the most

thorc-,1ugh dissatisfaction every-here prevailed.

Schwas the

state of affairs when the constitution was framed and the clause
giving Congress power to regulate commerce
was the result.

It is

mong thestates

apparent that such a proviso was

absolutely essential at the time to the harmony oot the country
at large;

and the wisdom of its adoption has been abundantly

demonstrated by the outcome.
But we must look closely at the clause referred to that
its meaning may be clear.

What does "regulate" mean as used
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in this connection?

Th, evident intention of the originators

of this idea was to restrict

the S4 ates from

enacting laws

which might or could actively operate to interfere with the
of comodities between the states.

free interchange

But we

cannot believe that it was ever intended to prevent the states
from any legislation which
erate to
wou id

might indirectly and remotely opSuch a contention

ffect inter-state commerce.

surely be absurd cince, if carried to a logical conclu-

sion, it would clearly establish that any provision of the
state which had anything whatever to
merce,

do with inter-state com-

or the business transacted between the stat6s,

was,

in

somne de rree a "repulation" and therefore unconstitu-tional.
The languwte

of .?r.Thstice Strong Ikm±

in

the case of

$?State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts", 15 Wal.293, seems to
express most forcibly and cogently the common sense view of
this matter.

e says:-

"1'io doubt every tax upon personal property or upon occupations,

business or franchises,

affects more or less the sub-

jects and the operations of commerce.

Yet it is not everything

that %.ffectscommaerce that amounts to a regulation of it

within

the meaning of the constitution."

And again in disc' ssing the tax in quzestion in that case,
wkich was a tax directly on the gross receipts of the railroad
including that portion received for the

transportation of

freight to and from points without the state,

he says:--
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"Is this tax then, a tax upon freight transported into,
or o-it of, the state, or upon the owner of the freight for the
right of thus transporting it?

Certainly it is not directly.

Very manifestly it is a tax upon the railroad company measured
in t-jnou t by the extent of its business or the degree to which
its franchise is exorcised.
That its ultimate effect may be
to increase the co;t of transportation, must be admitted.
it must be Ztt.mitted I.that

So

tax upon any article of personal prop

erty that may become a subject of cowmerce, or ur on any instrumnt

commerce,

affects commerce
mf
itself.

the instrmient, such as

a stage-coach,

or steamboat, its tendency
tation.

If the tax be upon

a r-iroad car, or a can&

is to increase the cost of transpor-

Still it is not a tax upon transportation or upon

commerce and it has never been seriously doubted
tax may be laid.

A tax upon landlords as such, affects rents

and generally increases them,
it

tiat such a

a tax upon tenants.

but it would be a misnomer to call

A tax upon the occupatib.n of a phy-

sician or attcrney measured by the income of his profes:1Aon, or
upon a banker gra<;uated according to the amounts of his discounts or deposits,

will hardly be claimed to be a tax on his

patients, clients or customers, though the burden ultimately

falls upon them. 11
This reasoning sounds to us like the plaines
common sense, and we have not seen it
in any opposings argu ment.

It

is

effoctviely

after all thorn,

kind of
controverted
i

question of

fact which we have before us when we undertake the consideration
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of a statute like the one which occaioned this discussion.
Does t:e statute in

qiiestion so operate as to amo-nt in

to a regulation of commerce between the states?
its

fact

That is, do

provisions impose such a burden upon that commerce as will

res-'lt in actual burden to the comnrriore itself or to the shipper
or receiver,
ITf they do,

because of the trirsportatirn of such cornmerce?
then any such statute is

to enact and falls
gross.

ithin

beyond the p rer of a state

the excluisive Jurisdiction

of Con-

If they do not, then such a Statute is entirely Justi-

fLiable and the states alone

have power to act.

To attempt to reconcile the decisions on this subJect
woild be absolutely useless for they c.nnot be reconciled.
would it

Nor

be any more possible to deduce or formulate from them

any abstract propositions of law with respect to inter-state
commerce, which may be s9iAd to be clearly established or perma*nently settled.
Lir.
case,

Justice Field, who

wrote the opinion in the Vaine

was one of the three Jstices

ion of Mylr.

Justice

Strong in

Gross Receipts" quoted supra,
uranimous

the

',ho dissented to the opincase of "State Tax on Railway

while the

whole court were

in holding as uinconstitutional and void a Pennsylvan&

statute upon the

rros3 r: ceipt$ of a stemmship company incorpor-

ated under the laws of that state, becau;se such receipts were
largely derived from inter-state comtmerce.
vs. Penn.,

(Phila.

S.S. Co.

122 U.S.,326.)

An: number of parallel instances might be cited
how the members of the highest Judicial body in

to show

our land have
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appeared first on one side of this controversy#
of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I,

F rom the case

to the '.Maine case under dis-

curssion, the Supreme Court has been constantly bes@t withlthe
Consider'ation of the inter-state commwerce question,

presented

to them in an infinite variety of ways and from every possible
point of view.
Lb4r.Justioe Bradley has bcen conspicuous as the unyielding
advocate
states,

of the policy of absolutte non-intervertion
even in

ar-thing

by the

the remotest and most indirect marhner with

that m. y pos-ibly affect inter-state coLerce.

In

earlier times, earlieritic
no doubt the majority of the court believe#7ith
him in this uncompromising severity of restriction.
Field was,

at one time,

decidedly of this opinion.

inclined to believe tlhat in
Trunk R ilway,

there is

:.r.Jstice
Bit we are

this decision of Tlaine vs. Grand

indicated a decided inclination of the

Supreme Court to refuse to carryf

reasoning restriction any farther.

this policy of absolute un-

And we believe that the

only possible solution in future cases will be to apply the
test already :entioned, which car:not fail to five adequate
reasons for the sanction or disapproval of a statute which
seems to intergere i;ith the inter-state commerce clause of
the constitution.
To continue on the course advocatld byr
would be fhlly

:r.Justice

P radley

to exempt fvvm all liLbility for the support ;df

thle diffterent states an enormous amount of capital which is
receiving daily the greatest benefits from those states.

That
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sch a consummation is devoutly to be dreaded, no sane man can
deny.

And we are profoi ndly grateful to see the first

StImnblinro-block thrown in the path toward absolute immunity of
s:ch franchises from taxation by the clear and lo-ical opinion
of -r.Jstice
Fild in the case of MCine vs. Urrnd C'ri7nk Rail-

June, 1894.

